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FIONA PROBYN-RAPSEY

Paternalism and Complicity:
Or How Not to Atone
for the 'Sins of the Father'

T

HE cultural politics of Australian colonialism revolve around discourses of
paternalism and the ' protection' of Aboriginal people. Understanding how
paternalism reproduces itself transgenerationally, and between whites and
Aboriginal people, between subordinated groups, between women, is one way to
approach its limits. Starting with this premise, I examine the ways in which
paternalism reproduces itself, such that even today white paternalistic attitudes
towards Aboriginal people and culture are pervasive. I focus here on Mary Ellen
Jordan ' s Australian memoir Balanda: My Year in Arnhem Land (2005), which is
critical of, and complicit with, the biopolitical power of paternalism and its
accompanying rhetoric of 'protection ' . I read this memoir within the context of a
broader, shifting genealogy of protection within Australian cultural history, teasing
out some of the implications of the capacity of paternalism to mutate and to retain its
cultural and political influence.
In Jordan ' s memoir, a young white Australian woman working for a community
cultural centre in Maningrida, a remote Aboriginal conununity in Arnhem Land,
becomes increasingly sceptical of her role as white ' protector' of Aboriginal culture.
The memoir traces her growing resentment at what she calls the 'protection racket'
that whites offer Aboriginal people. 1 In her view this ' protection' is self-serving
because it fails to protect Aboriginal people from white domination, while it stymies
Aboriginal 'self determination' . In Jordan 's judgement, the 'protection racket' in
Maningrida in fact gives more opportunities to whites than to Aboriginal people, as
well as entrenching poverty in the Aboriginal community. When she expresses her
views to another white resident he replies, 'When you ' re a bit older and you ' ve been
around as long as me, you' 11 realise that these people have to be protected from
themselves ' (206) . Jordan comes to believe that the 'threat ' to the community does
not come from within but from white paternalism.
In Maningrida, Jordan is ' in a world that seemed utterly foreign to me' (21), and
feels like she had 'never been part of such a small minority before - there were 100150 Balandas [non-indigenous] in a community of around 1500' (18) . She had
'expected the community to be a mish -mash of black and white - but in fact there
was a sharp social divide' (8) . She is offended at the first dinner party she is invited

I There are echoes of Judith Stiehm . See her Women and Men 's Wars (New York : Pergamon , 19 83)
and Arms and !he Enlis1ed Wom en (Philadelphia : Temp le UP, 1989).
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to, where another Balanda tells her that the place is a good one 'as long as you don't
have to mix with the locals' (36). On the whole, Jordan finds those holding such
explicitly racist views are outnumbered by people who have what she describes as a
'positive' racism of romanticisation: 'In Balanda thinking, Aboriginal people could
be elevated and mythologised in a way that seemed to take away their status as real
people' (147). The consequence is that their 'failure' to live up to the romantic
image opens up the possibility for discrimination. Beth Povinelli's argument about
the image that underpins Native Title Legislation supports this view: she observes
that the love of the 'traditional' Aboriginal constructs Aboriginal people as ' failures
of ... the very identity that identifies them' (29).
The discourse of 'self-determination' has, from the 1970s, been the dominant
rhetoric of Aboriginal governance. Jordan had been expecting a community which
functioned according to this idea (9) because it had been founded on 'post-Whitlam
ideals of land rights and self-determination' (92). Instead, she found that things
'rarely ran in an Aboriginal way in Maningrida. I had expected to be surrounded by
the exotic, but instead I was enmeshed in white bureaucracy, a jungle of Latinate
tenns like acquit, triplicate and application ' (91) . For her, the measure of the success
of self-determination would be separation, 'rupture', a tern1 Tim Rowse uses in his
critique of the policy: 'people are being asked to be self-detennining within social
fom1s bequeathed by an era of"assimilation." The resources they have to work with,
both material and rhetorical, are too far rooted in our shared pasts to justify
celebrations of rupture with the bad old days' (1 0).
In her critique of the protection racket, Jordan taps into one of Australian
colonialism's key concepts. Protection - paternalism's key term - is deeply embedded in white thinking when it comes to Aboriginality. 2 Balanda illustrates the
way in which growing up white involves the accumulation of paternalistic attitudes
towards Aboriginal people, as if it is built into the very fabric of the subject position
'white Australian'. It is important to note that this is not, in any simple sense, a
conservative attitude, but informs liberal attitudes as well. Talking to her friend in
Melbourne, Jordan recounts:
We had talked a lot about Aboriginal issues over the years, trying to figure out what we
thought, what was right and what ought to be done. We had worked out a framework
2

The Australian colonies were quick to make ' Protection' a bureaucratic preoccupation. ' Protectors'
of Aborigines- and the word is most frequently in scare quotes to signal its deadly irony- were
appointed in South Australia (founded in 1835) and Victoria ( 1838). George Augustus Robinson
was the first Chief Protector of the Port Philip District in 1839 and more famously Protector of
Aborigines in Tasmania. Official Protectors were appointed much later in Queensland (1897; see
Rosalind Kidd , Th e Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs - the Untold StOI J' [St Lucia, Qld: U of
Queensland P , 1997]. p. 13) and New South Wales, which appointed its first official protector in
1881 . This position was abolished with the introduction of the NSW Aborigines Protection Act
/909- 1943 which established the Aborigines Protection Board, renamed the Aborigines Welfare
Board in 1943. The Protection Boards were set up to monitor and regulate the lives, including
marriages, births, work and residence of Aboriginal people and those associated with them.
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for understanding Aboriginal issues that was typical of the young, left wing, socialjustice-oriented people we knew. It was clear to us that because Aboriginal people had
been wronged by the white invasion , the Australian government ought to give them as
much money as it would take to fix or alleviate the problems that colonisation had
caused. The social problems like domestic violence and alcohol abuse, health problems
like diabetes and heart disease, economic problems, language loss- all of these should
be tackled by government programs, because we owed it to Aboriginal people. Before I
went to Maningrida, it hadn ' t occurred to me that ' solutions ' that came from the
outside would be so ineffective. (88- 89)

Jordan describes the way in which a paternalistic relationship to Aboriginality
fonned an anchor for her white identity and her politics. She describes herself as
having a 'strong but unfocussed social conscience' (160) , which is supplemented by
a 'medley of white guilt, ignorance and earnest but unfocussed respect' (185).
In the face of a subordinated community Jordan initially sees some direction for
herself, recounting that she had felt that the Aboriginal community in Maningrida
needed protection from non-indigenous culture: 'we thought that Aboriginal cultures
were intrinsically worth preserving. By taking on the Balanda aspects of their lives
for them, we wanted to protect Aboriginal people from contamination by the
dominant culture' (91). ' Contamination' means the decline of traditional cultures;
'decline' is a key tern1 for inviting protection:
I had come to Maningrida with similar romanticised perceptions, thinking that
Aboriginal cultures and languages could remain intact, maybe even thrive, if only they
were protected by a buffer of benevolent white people. I thought that it was appropriate
for Balandas to do the work, because the role of 'being Aboriginal' was important and
significant in itself, and should not be impinged on by Balanda style work. (148-49)

This rhetoric gets to the heart of the paradox of protection: to protect from the thing
that one is is not protection so much as a confirmation of domination.
In the context of feminist readings of women's subordination, Wendy Brown
notes that 'to be "protected" by the very same power whose violation one fears
perpetuates the very modality of dependence and powerlessness' (170). Jordan
comes to see 'protection ' in similar terms, and reconfigures her 'good intentions' as
'wounding' (91) . Later, she says, 'our good intentions were patronising, and ... our
underlying assumptions about Aboriginal people reinforced their passive position
and our right to make decisions on their behalf (148-49). This critique renders
Jordan 's text postcolonial rather than colonial, for it is both critical of and complicit
with past practices.
What is fascinating about this memoir is that Jordan locates ' the problems '
afflicting the conununity within the discourse of ' protection' , whilst continuing to
occupy a paternalistic position, often speaking ' in the best interests' of those who do
not speak: ' Sometimes I felt that the best I could say of the role of Balandas in
Maningrida was that we were paternalistic. The worst was that the system we
worked within prevented Aboriginal people from taking responsibility for
94
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themselves and their communities' (218- 19). The memoir identifies paternalism as a
condition of the recent past- 'we were paternalistic', 'were patronising', 'reinforced
their passive position ' - but shows that the patemalism remains . The paternalism
manifests in Jordan's diagnosis of the failures of 'self determination ', though
positioned primarily as a failed white policy, relies on a reading of Aboriginal
'failure-to-be-self-detennining' within terms set by and understood by whites. To
put it another way, Jordan, as a white woman, is not in a strong position to judge the
success or failures of self-detemlination for Aboriginal people, and each time she
protests the domination of the system she works within, she reiterates a paternalist
position, a paradox that the policy of 'self-determination' sets up. Noel Pearson 's
work is cited as support for her observations, but we hear little from the people that
the system fails. It could be argued that this silence reflects the nature of their
subordination, but it is more the case that patemalism structures that engagement in
the first place; as such, Jordan's reference to Pearson, a paternalist of a different sort
from within the Cape York communit)', is apt and unsurprising. They are both
disappointed with the lack of difference, the lack of a rupture between the 'bad old
days' (pre-Land rights, citizenship rights) and the creation of welfare systems
designed to support communities.
By and large the memoir does not engage with the question of how Jordan 's view
might differ from the views of the Aboriginal people with whom she works.
However, the epilogue provides a potentially different perspective on the protection
racket she describes. Jordan recounts Valerie ' mimicking the way Balandas reacted
to her, and then she laughed her head off. I remembered looking at her in
astonishment. She was playing with the notion of Aboriginal mystique. She knew
what the Balandas thought about her, and about themselves: she was onto us ' (220). 3
Jordan's look of astonishment, as well as the realisation that 'she was onto us' , end
the book and also challenge it, being two of very few indications that the passivity
and dependency Jordan diagnoses could be read differently. Ending here, the
ramifications of Valerie's rnimicry are foreclosed , protecting paternalism from the
implications of its dependency on the 'helped'. Had this 'astonishment' come
earlier, it rnight have provoked dialogue on a different plane, not of failure but of
'response-ability' and a reconsideration of different types of dependency, including
dependency as a condition of sociality and subjectivity. 4
3

4

'M imicry', Homi Bhabha has noted in 'Of Mimicry and Man', is a powerful subversion of colonial
power where the colonised comes to ·resemble but men ace' the colonisers ( 127). It works on the
basis of unsettling the coloniser's presumption that the colonised are, and aspire to be, easily read
and positioned within the colonial hierarch y.
Jordan 's 'astonishment' at seeing Valerie 's ' play' is the astonishment of the writer who, in tellin g
the 'history of the Other' is 'pushed against th e limits of ... [her] own' (Sara Suleri, Th e Rhetoric of
English India [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992), p. 2). The style of the memoir, in proceeding
towards a political argument about self-determination rather than offering a meditation on
whiteness or intercultural dialogue , shuts down what this scene might have opened up .
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Dependence needs to be rethought, not in ten11S of its 'familial ' or patemalistic
structure of parent/child - a process in which the 'subjectivity' of the latter is fanned
in relation to the former - but as a relationship between different subjectivities in an
intercultural dialogue. Kelly Oliver writes,
the ethical subject as witnessing subjectivity acknowledges her dependence upon her
addressee and interlocutor whom she cannot possess but upon whom she is absolutely
dependent for her very subjectivity. This moment is the moment of ethical selfconsciousness for the witnessing subject. It is the moment in which the subject realises
that an ethical obligation to others is built into the condition of possibility for
subjectivity. (325)

Subject positions always qualify the potential of ethical relationships. In Australia,
the subject position of the white woman is still coded in terms of the 'helper' and,
according to Aileen Moreton-Robinson, is still largely unconsciously complicit with
white colonialism. Jordan 's text a1mounces a missed opportunity to extend a critique
of protection to a critique of structures of colonialism and whiteness itself.
Tim Rowse 's White Flour, White Power argues that the system of rationing did
not simply accompany the colonial relationship, but articulated it. Consequently,
Rowse finds that "'pauperism" is one of the central concepts of Australian
colonialism' (40), and that such descriptions became prescriptive. He points out that
the term 'pauper' is a ' tem1 of moral and political disapproval , used by would-be
helpers to describe the lack of co-operation of the poor with philanthropy's
conditions' (40) . In their genealogy of dependency, American critics Nancy Fraser
and Linda Gordon find that in post-industrial societies dependency is 'feminized and
racialized; the new psychological meanings have strong feminine associations, while
currents once associated with the native and slave are increasingly inflecting the
discourse about welfare' (25). Such a critique seems pertinent to Jordan 's and
Pearson's concems about passive welfare protection: Jordan writes , 'Aboriginal
people were making us indispensable: they had no intention of taking on our jobs
and worries when there was no earthly need to do so' (95). On this basis, she
worries about a time in the future when
the government funding was cut, or when for some reason there were no Balandas
willing to come to Amhem Land and do the community ' s work for it. Most of the
Aboriginal people there had never known a time without a benevolent Balanda
presence in their li ves, and without the flo w of government money into their hands .
(95)

In the critique and description of passivity there is also prescription: ' they had never
knaW11 '. But presumably ' they' know things other than what Jordan knows about
them, as Valerie's mimicry suggests.
My concem here, though, is not to focus on arguing against the political trajectory
of the memoir and its echoes of Noel Pearson 's Our Right to Take Responsibility,
nor even in tracing the gaps and silences for altematives to Jordan 's view of the
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' protection racket'. Rather, what interests me is the ways in which the memoir might
help to understand how paternalism reproduces itself. As I indicated earlier, the
question is not the extent to which paternalism pervades Australian culture, but
understanding its capacity to transmit itself amongst whites, particularly.
Jordan's desire for liberal-inflected atonement brings her into a paternalistic
relationship which she initially adheres to: 'We accepted the system that we
inherited, and assumed that eventually, with education, Aboriginal people would
step into the jobs now done by Balandas' (92). What interests me is that paternalism
was, for Jordan, initially a 'good' and therefore accepted or acceptable inheritance,
while colonialism came to be associated with the 'bad' past and with the 'sins of the
father'. How did paternalism occupy the space of the 'good ' here? And how does it
appear to be separate from colonialism, when in fact it is a means by which
colonialism is articulated? What is the dynamic that allows white Australians to
reproduce paternalism, still believing themselves to be 'good'?
To consider this question, we need to consider what kind of 'power' paternalism
is, and the relationship of that power to more frequently contested forms of colonial
violence. Paternalism is biopolitical power, or biopower, power that does not kill but
which cultivates life in particular forn1s (Foucault). Foucault did not complete his
work in relation to outlining how this system of power operates, but others have
gone on to define the concept. For the purposes of my reading of Balanda, and
analysis of Australian colonialism more specifically, I have found the elaboration of
Foucault's work by Rabinow and Rose to be particularly useful. They describe
biopolitics as containing the following features:
Strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health,
initially addressed to populations that may or may not be territorialized upon the
nation, society or pre-given communities, but may also be specified in terms of
emergent biosocial collectivities, sometimes specified in terms of categories of race,
ethnicity, gender or religion. Modes of subjectification, in which individuals can be
brought to work on themselves, under certain f01ms of authority, in relation to truth
discourses, by means of practices of the self, in the name of individual or collective life
or health. (2- 3)

Paternalism is biopolitical in the sense that it works to focus on the 'health ' of the
individual, in their best interests, as collective group, even those ambivalently placed
within the nation. Biopolitics include a positive affirmation of health, life and
longevity, but this mode is not characteristic of 'settler' or colonial power only,
which is why Aboriginal leaders inhabit the biopolitical while contesting its
administration (see Pearson) .
Paternalism is characterised by domination coupled with love and affection ,
where one party, which assumes superiority, purports to act 'in the best interests ' of
the subordinate. Its roots are in an image of a family projected onto an institution
like a sovereign or government. Jack D. Douglas argues that ' maternalism and
paternalism have always been among the most successful of devices of self-
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presentation by those who wish to influence others ' (172). Paternalism then, as a
form of power, predicates what George Lakoff sees as 'part of our standard
conceptual repertoire', which is the 'nation as family'. This trope or metaphor of
political conununity takes a particularly strong form in colonial societies, where the
colonised are positioned as children - indeed, Protection boards in Australia often
made reference to their positioning as acting in loco parentis. The stolen generations
would have to be the most obvious expression of the 'nation as family' trope in the
control of Aboriginal people: the State represented children who were parent-less,
and then could be 'taken' in by the surrogate father state.
Douglas argues that there is a crucial distinction between what he calls ' genetic
paternalism' and 'state paternalism', and that ' genetic paternalism is by far the most
important fonn of sincerely cooperative paternalism' (174). He defines 'genetic
paternalism' as 'any fonn of paternalism (doing good for others in the name of
"what is good for them") in which those acting paternally are sincerely acting to
help the other person become more independently competent over the long run'
(174). In contrast, ' conflictful paternalism' ' is any form of paternalism that is not
aimed at the long run independent competence and equality of the submissive
member of the relation' (174). This is the kind of paternalism that Jordan is so
disappointed to find in Maningrida's white and Aboriginal relationships. By
contrast, Mary R. Jackman reads paternalism as ' discrimination without the
expression of hostility' (10), arguing that the emphasis on ' conflict' in social science
readings of power inequality often results in scholars overlooking the more subtle
forms of 'consensual' or even cooperative power. She suggests that there is an
'inconsistent attitude structure' , of love and domination, 'that lies at its core' and
which enhances the ' dominant group 's ability to practice discrimination' (273) . It is
this 'inconsistency' and incoherence that makes paternalism so much less likely to
come under scrutiny than open hostility and violence.
In the context of these observations, the recent 'History Wars' are of particular
interest. Debate centres on a dispute over the level of violence by settlers against
indigenous people. The main antagonists have been the self-published and selfproclaimed public intellectual Keith Windschuttle, who argues for a ' benign
colonisation' rather than a violent one, and academic historians like Henry Reynolds
and Lyndall Ryan, whose work did much to establish (in scholarly terms) the level
of conflict across Australia. Much of this debate has focused on the frontier violence
of dispossession, the number of dead, because this, as both sides would agree,
reflects on the ' national character' , 'who we are as a people '. As Patrick Brantlinger
points out, 'The history of British Imperialism around the world does not support
Windschuttle' s belief that it was mainly benign, or that it was somehow effectively
restrained by a humanitarian and religious culture on the frontiers in North America,
Australia and elsewhere' (669).
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Windschuttle's arguments, and those of some of his cnt1cs, are based on
privileging the benevolent practice of colonialism associated with the missions, the
evangelical protection of 'god's children', over violent dispossession. Paternalism,
on the other hand, is much less spectacular, much more mundane; it is not about the
risk of death on the frontier, but the maintenance of life in a particular fom1 . As
Jordan says, 'It wasn't an ochre-coloured frontier adventure for me or my friends or
colleagues. It was every day life ' (213). So, too, paternalism is about 'everyday life'
and we miss it if we focus exclusively on the violent frontier as colonialism's
principal character. While it is tempting to say that protection is a 'lesser evil'
compared with the physical violence of warfare and indiscriminate killing, the point
is that biopolitical power recoils at waste of life. Thus, it seeks to maintain it in a
particular fonn: on a reservation, sober, willing to trade, monogamous, disease free,
and as knowing British subjects. 5 As well as the question of genocide, it would be
fruitful to also consider how colonialism in Australia sought to 'maintain' the life of
Aboriginal people in particular forn1s, thus rendering suspect any recourse to an
argument based on a presumed ' benign' colonisation. It is not a matter of genocide
or protection, but rather a question of genocide and protection.
The work of feminist philosophers, including most recently Iris Marion Young,
suggest that the idea that violation precedes protection in a temporal or
chronological order is wrong because, in a crucial sense, violation and protection
have a complicated entanglement. The presumption that violence precedes
protection implies a moral order, with the 'first' kind of violence appearing worse
than the ' second'. Such thinking, while understandable, underplays the complexity
of their interdependence, or complicity: in Australian colonialism, protective paternalism controls and enables through controlled proximity to violence. This proximity is
protection's problem, and its raison d 'etre. It cannot escape the violence it is
supposed to buffer; it is complicit with what it seeks to ameliorate. Perhaps because
of this complicity, paternalism might usefully be thought of in tem1s of the
pharmakon, being simultaneously poison and cure (Derrida). This is the paradox at
the centre of Jordan 's memoir, which functions as a diagnosis of the problem of
white paternalism that does not see that such a white diagnosis is not only a cure, but
also the poison. This paradox brings us back to the issue of paternalism's capacity to
transmit itself.

5

On e Chief Protector, Dr Cecil Cook in the Northern Territory ( 192 7- 1939) seems to have
appreciated this complicity. Cook described the role of Protector by reference to the 1864
expedition from Adelaide into country that is now the Northern Territory. Dr F. E. Goldsmith was
appointed to ' prevent the affliction of the native people with imported communicable diseases ....
He was to foster friendly relation s and offer inducements to them to work , to encourage trad e, and
to police scrupulous discharge of obligations to them. He was to make them co mprehend th e ir
privileges and responsibilities as British subjects to prevent interference w ith th eir women or their
debauchery with liquor, and to control the issu e of relief rations ' (560-61 ).
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Jordan ' s own relationship to her father is significant here. In the middle of her
memoir, when she is busy attempting to 'atone for the sins of our fathers', her own
father dies. With this news she experiences some relief, having been estranged from
him for some years because of the violence of his relationship to the family:
On hearing the news of his death, my sister told me, one of our other sisters had said to
another, ' Maybe now we can stop having nightmares.' I put the phone down and
walked quietly past the dinner table and out the door. Once I was outside, I began to
cry. The tears were not for the loss of a man I barely knew, but for the pain of a
childhood spent in fear of his violence, for the scars that he had left on me and my
brothers and sisters, for the sadness and grief that had come with the absence of a
loving father and the presence instead of this terrifying man. ( 125)

The reader may surmise that Jordan resisted the violence of her own father in order
to become a different !Gnd of citizen, one who sought to 'help' the vulnerable rather
than to create them. While Jordan appears to hold that she is not dominated or
defined by her relationship with her violent father, she is still affected by his
absence, his shadow and alternative (125). Jordan takes up this position of the
' loving father ' in relation to Aborigines, thus substantiating the absence that she
grieves for. Her violent father operates as Other to this ' loving father'.
Young points out that, within the logic of protection, dominant men are 'bad men '
while 'good men' are those who protect us, infantilised women and children, from
them, aggressive masculine violators (4). This model positions women and children
within an economy of paternalism, caught between the dominance of aggressive
men and the protection of carers. Consequently, as Young points out, 'dominative
masculinity in this way constitutes protective masculinity as its other' (4). Building
on the work of Mohanty and Narayan, Young makes the point that western feminists
have utilised this framing to situate themselves as carers or ' loving protectors '
(Paisley), as opposed to aggressive masculine types . The logic of protection and
patemalism requires conflict, threats of violence, in order that other forn1s of
colonial domination pass as 'good'. It is this relationship between conflict and
consensus, threat and protection, bad and good, which is the key to understanding
how paternalism reproduces itself. It is not through total rupture, for the end to
violence would equate to no role for the protector; where then would whiteness go?
In terms of Australian colonialism, this argument has a number of ramifications.
Colonial paternalism situates itself as the good protector, precisely when it
represents past violence as that to which it stands in apparent contrast. In Jordan 's
references to the 'sins of the father', it appears that she too takes up this rhetoric of
feminine care versus masculine violence, only to reveal its instability. The failure of
the ' loving father' to ' help ' is positioned in the memoir as an Aboriginal failure as
much as the failure of whites, who do not realise that the nation is not a family. The
death of the father/s - Jordan rhetorically kills offthe 'loving father' in Balanda by
her rejection of protection - is recounted in the midst of an episode in which Jordan
100
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is sexually harassed and stalked by an Aboriginal man. This leaves her very
frightened and she eventually has to leave her flat. The domestic violence that she
recalls from her childhood and the violence threatened by the Aboriginal man are
both instantly recognisable as requiring protection against. But as Jordan discovers,
the rhetoric of protection is closely aligned to the violence that it opposes. In
response to Archie's offer to build a wire mesh screen around her flat, Jordan
responds: 'I didn't want to live in a cage. But I did want to be safe' (122). The point
here is not that the harassment is like a cage, but to show that these terms , violence
and protection, are twins; they operate, double-helix like, at the heart of patemalism
itself, splitting, doubling and coming together again and again.
The colonial paternalism expressed by Jordan is c01runitted to change, to remedy
and redeem, to participate in a rupture with that past and to be the loving father as
opposed to the violent one. Its commitment reflects the idea that responsibility for
historic injustice is inherited along ' family lines ' (Thompson) . But in a country
where whites assume the position of cultural managers , such inheritances can
include patemalistic interventions. Patemalism attaches itself to the past and to
projected 'sins of the father', drawing it closer to the violation it is committed to
protect others from. It is dependent on constructing the ' problems ' of colonialism as
located with particular elements (for instance 'white invasion' in the past, or the
'mother country') rather than with the ongoing structure of colonisation. This suits
the logic of protection yet again, for it is not a discourse that seeks to alter the
structure; rather, it attempts to install a complementary fom1 of disciplinary power, a
biopolitical power, which seeks to maintain life in a particular form. The constant
division or mitosis of violation/protection is the dynamic behind patemalism.
Between violation and protection there is complicity; it is complicity that joins these
two things together, complicity in the sense of being an accomplice, and in the sense
of complexity of involvement.
Jordan's 'shame' as a white Australian critic of colonialism does not do justice to
the structural nature of colonialism: ' I was disgusted with myself for buying into it
and made an effort to stop' (139). Shame is, as Sara Ahmed notes , a temporary,
fleeting thing that suggests a getting over in order to enter into pride (1 07, 109- 10) .
In Craft for a Dry Lake Kim Mahood confesses her shame in using her skin name
'to claim a certain credibility among urban friends for my knowledge of Aboriginal
society' (125). Mahood and Jordan contextualise the ' shame ' of their possessive
interest in Aboriginality, where the white knowers of Aboriginality congratulate
themselves on their capacity to know the Other, without the Other ever having to
speak. Rather than shame, it might be more useful to think of complicity.
Complicity appeals to the structural as much to the personal , momentary condition
of response-ability (Probyn-Rapsey; see also Sanders) .
Patemalism operates as a key tem1 in Australian postcolonialism and maintains
this presence by its iterability. Key to the reproduction of patemalism is the ways in
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which it draws on the ' nation as family ' trope, a trope that is deeply embedded in
our political and moral imaginations (Lakoff), and one that, importantly, supports its
biopolitical nature. Patemalism unites love, affection and power in a way that
sometimes insulates it from critique. And patemalism necessitates the identification
of repressive elements, the ' sins of the father', the 'bad old days', in order to situate
itself as a preferred model. This dynamic produces iterability, repetition with a
difference. Balanda makes clear that the desired rupture between violence and
protection is continually deferred, and that the terms lie in a complicit relationship
within patemalism.
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